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INTRODUCTION
In Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited
("Pagosa IT'), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument that
governmental entities act in a legislative capacity when they make
conditional water right appropriations; thus, the courts do not owe
deference to these governmental agencies for the claimed amounts of
water the agencies deem reasonably necessary for their future use.'
Prior decisions acknowledged that courts should defer to a
municipality's "managerial judgment" and the courts "should not
intrude their own opinions to override the studied good-faith opinions
of governmental agencies as to future needs of the public for facilities
or commodities."2 Despite this longstanding recognition for the need
for flexibility in municipal water supply planning, the Colorado
Supreme Court narrowly construed the limited governmental agency
exception to the anti-speculation doctrine in order to meet Colorado's
"maximum utilization and optimum beneficial use goals." 3 The court
concluded that governmental agencies' conditional appropriations are
not immune from judicial review under the proceedings and standards
of the Water Rights Determination and Administration Act.4 However,

the court's conclusion arguably clashes with the General Assembly's
statutory exemption from the anti-speculation statute.5 Furthermore,
the conclusion clashes with a governmental agency's legislative
discretion, which law-makers recognize in a wide range of other
matters, including ratemaking, annexation, and the exercise of police
powers, such as decisions related to public safety, zoning, and the
promotion of aesthetic values. Courts should be sensitive so as not to

1. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I), 219 P.3d
774, 788 (Colo. 2009). PagosaHIis the second in a series of two consecutive cases with
Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d 307
(Colo. 2007) (en banc) as the first. In Pagosa I, the Colorado Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a one hundred year planning horizon for a new
conditional appropriation is inherently speculative. Id. at 313. The court held that a one
hundred year planning horizon period was speculative and adopted a three-part test for
determining whether a governmental agency has an intent to make a non-speculative
conditional appropriation of unappropriated water. Id. at 313, 320. The court

remanded the case to the water court, which, after additional fact-finding, entered a
modified decree. Pagosa II, 219 P.3d at 776-77. This decree gave rise to an appeal to
the Colorado Supreme Court, resulting in PagosaII Id.
2. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939); Metro.
Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 289
(Colo. 1961).
3. Pagosa1, 219 P.3d at 317.
4. See id.at 314 n.6, 320.
5. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (I) (2009).
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"inappropriately infringe on the water management decisions of...
municipal water officials;" these decisions are just as or more important
than other decisions that governmental agencies make for which they
exercise legislative discretion.
This article examines whether the Colorado Supreme Court
usurped the discretion that governmental agencies exercise when the
court held, in PagosaII, that governmental agencies must prove specific
elements and factors when adjudicating new municipal water right
appropriations. Examining the development of the great and growing
cities doctrine as adopted in City & County of Denver v. Sheriff
('Sheriff), this article next explores the evolution of Colorado's antispeculation doctrine and its growing tension with the great and growing
cities doctrine. The article then reviews the Colorado Supreme Court's
decisions in Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited
("Pagosa f') and Pagosa Area Water & Sanitadon Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited ("Pagosa If') and the new municipal planning standards the
court adopted. Ultimately, against this extensive background, the
article argues that the Colorado Supreme Court has infringed on the
legislative discretion of governmental agencies by specifically requiring
the water courts to assess the reasonableness of certain "factors"
historically reserved for government decision-making.

I.
A.

GREAT AND GROWING CITIES DOCTRINE

THE DENVER WATER BOARD AND THE MOFFAT WATER TUNNEL

Pursuant to the 1919 conditional water right statute,7 the Denver
Water Board filed a petition with the Grand County District Court to
adjudicate its claim for the maximum amount of water (1,280 cubic feet
per second ("cfs")) that could be carried from a collection system on
the Fraser River through the 10.5 foot pioneer bore of the Moffat
Railroad Tunnel for municipal and irrigation purposes.'
6. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 52-53 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc).
7. In 1919, the General Assembly required adjudication of all water rights in order
to establish the rights' priorities and enforce them. HAROLD H. ELLIS & MEYERJ. PETER
DEBRAAL, WATER RIGHTS INTHE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 472 (2004). An uncompleted

appropriation was styled a "conditional" decree. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730, 745 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
8. Amended Statement of Claim at 3, Fraser River Diversion Project, No. 657 (Dist.
Ct. Colo., July 13, 1937). Denver's 1937 amended statement of claim described the
Moffat Water Tunnel as a constructed tunnel with a diameter of 10.5 feet and a carrying
capacity of 1,280 cfs. Id. The amount claimed for beneficial use was also 1,280 cfs even
though only 600 cfs had been diverted. Id. at 10. Denver claimed that the City and
County of Denver had a population of 300,000 persons and was constantly growing. Id.
at 14. In order to provide sufficient water for its growing needs, Denver asserted that it
was necessary that the construction of the Denver Municipal Water System provide a
greater supply of water than needed for immediate use by its inhabitants. Id. at 15-16.
Consequently, it was the custom of the City and County of Denver to lease water it did
not need for immediate use to other water users including irrigation. Id. at 16.
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Through the decree, the trial court imposed restrictive conditions to
prevent any sale, lease, or alienation of Denver's South Platte River
water. 9 This guarded "against the City of Denver going into the
business of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her present
water rights and substituting the water acquired
or to be acquired in
10
this proceeding for her present water supply.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court struck this provision. It
confirmed that Denver's South Platte River water rights are property
rights and held:
If the city, for some legitimate reason, desired to abandon or sell any
of its Eastern Slope water, it would, by so doing, and under these
restrictions, jeopardize its water rights on the Western Slope. The
furnishing of an adequate supply of water to 350,000 people requires
managerial judgment and involves an ever-changing problem. To so
freeze and straight-jacket the city's Eastern Slope water rights, by the
restrictions involved here would be an arbitrary invasion of vested
property rights of the city.
Further, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that only courts
that had originally adjudicated Denver Water Board's South Platte River
water rights have jurisdiction to construe or modify Denver Water
Board's South Platte decrees."2 Thus, the court concluded that a trial
court on the western slope of Colorado did not have jurisdiction to
13
impose the restrictions on Denver's South Platte River water rights.
Finally, the court held:
[a]fter the water had been applied beneficially by the city, as the court
found relative to the 335 cubic feet, it became the property of the city

of Denver, and any such water for which there may at any given time in
the future be no immediate need, may be temporarily leased by the
city, in accordance with [section 31-35-201 of the Colorado Revised

9. See City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 839 (Colo. 1939). The
offending provision stated: "Any waters decreed herein, whether decreed therefore
[sic] to be for direct flow or for storage, and whether the said decree be absolute or
conditional, be diverted, taken and used as supplemental to the decreed water rights
now belonging to claimant, which said decrees are from the waters of the natural
streams of the State of Colorado and that the said claimant be required to satisfy its
needs for waters from said existing decrees owned by it before it shall be held to require
or need waters herein decreed or shall be entitled to take the same. That the waters
herein decreed shall be held by the said claimant as a water supply supplemental to its
present supply of water available under water decrees which the said claimant now holds
and to be used only to the extent necessary to fill the needs and requirements of the
claimant for municipal purposes, after it has made full and economical use of the waters
available to it under water decrees now owned by it." Id.
10. Id. at 840.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 841.
13.

Id.
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Statutes] 14
As to the contention that Denver Water Board had no immediate
need for the water, the Colorado Supreme Court established what
became the "longstanding" 15 great and growing cities doctrine:
The concern of the city is to assure an adequate supply to the public
which it serves. In establishing a beneficial use of water under such
circumstances the factors are not as simple and are more numerous
than the application of water to 160 acres of land used for agricultural
purposes. A specified tract of land does not increase in size, but
populations do, and in short periods of time. Wth that flexibility in
mind, itis not speculation but the highestprudenceon the part of the
city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs
resulting from a normal increase in population within a reasonable
period of time.16
Inherent in this doctrine is the principle of economies of scale.
Rather than continually building new pipes and conduits each time a
demand comes on the system, one may size the pumps and pipelines at
17
As
State
the time of design to accommodate future growth.
8
doctrine?
the
describes
Deptartmentof Ecology v. Theodoratus
The growing communities doctrine serves important functions. It
allows communities to secure a source of water to meet growing needs.
It also allows a community to construct a properly scaled water system
at the start rather than constantly expanding the system on a piecemeal basis to meet growing population. The realities of business life
and common sense come into play as well. The pumps and pipes
method "serves important purposes: it allows municipalities to
rationally plan and provide for future requirements."

... As a practical reality, it is impossible for a municipality simply to
tack on infrastructure and water rights year by year as its needs grow.
Instead, municipalities typically plan one or two decades ahead, or
more. The infrastructure required to serve a city cannot gradually be
sized up. Pipes, treatment facilities and other components must be
sized at the time of design to meet growing needs over time. Likewise,
in order to carry out its responsibility to its citizens, the city must
acquire water rights of sufficient size to meet those growing demands.
for a growing
Waiting until the last minute to acquire water rights
1
community would be the height of irresponsibility.0

14. Id. at 843.
15. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 n.6 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (Coats,J., concurring).
16. Sheriff,96 P.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
17. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Wash. 1998)
(Saunders, J., dissenting) (discussing the "growing communities doctrine").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1258. In Theodoratus,the issue was whether a vested water right could be
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THE DENVER WATER BOARD AND THE BLUE RIVER DIVERSION
PROJECT

In the 1942 Blue River adjudication in Summit County, Colorado,
the Denver Water Board claimed 1600 cfs of water from the Blue River
and its tributaries both for storage in Dillon Reservoir and direct
diversion through the twenty-three mile Roberts Tunnel, which conveys
water underneath the continental divide to the Denver Metropolitan
Area. 20 That water diversion discharges into the North Fork of the
South Platte River at the town of Grant, where the water flows to the
Denver Water Board's municipal intakes.2 '
Despite Denver Water Board's claim for 1600 cfs with a priority date
of March 21, 1914, the trial court awarded a conditional decree with an
appropriation date of June 24, 1946, for only 788 cfs. 22 The Denver
Water Board appealed, and on appeal the Colorado River Water
Denver's
protested
District") 23
("River
District
Conservation
appropriation claiming that the Denver Water Board had an adequate
supply of24 water and did not have an immediate need for the amount
In City & County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water
claimed.
ConservancyDistrict("Blue River'), the Colorado Supreme Court held:
We cannot hold that a city more than others is entitled to decree for
water beyond its own needs. However, an appropriator has a
reasonable time in which to effect his originally intended use as well as
to complete his originally intended means of diversion, and when

appropriations are sought by a growing city, regardshould be given to
its reasonably anticipated requirements ....

Particularly is this true in

awarded based upon the capacity of a private developer's water delivery system, or
whether a vested water right could be obtained only in the amount of water actually put
to beneficial use. Id. at 1243. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
determination that a final certificate of water right must be based upon actual
application of water to beneficial use, not upon system capacity. Id. The supreme court
noted, however, that the appellant was a private developer with a finite development
and not a municipality. Id. at 1247. Yet, the same court also noted that the Governor
had vetoed 1997 legislation that would have allowed for a system capacity measure of a
water right for public water supplies that fulfill municipal water supply purposes. Id.
This decision resulted in uncertainty to cities that held water certificates based upon
system capacity rather than actual use. In reaction to this decision, Washington's
General Assembly passed a comprehensive bill clarifying the nature of water rights for
municipal supply purposes that, in part, grandfathered existing water certificates based
upon system capacity and did not limit the measure of a municipal water right if it had
an approved municipal water plan. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330 (2009). In 2006,
the statute was challenged as unconstitutional. Lummi Indian Nation v. State of
Washington, No. 06-2-40103-4 (Sup. Ct. Wash., June 11, 2008) petition for cert. Filed
The trial judge determined that certain provisions were
(No. 81809-6).
unconstitutional and the appeal is pending. Id.
20. City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. (Blue River), 276
P.2d 992, 995-97 (Colo. 1954).
Reservoir,
Water,
Dillon
Denver
21. See
http://www.denverwater.org/Recreation/Dillon/ (last visitedJan. 30, 2010).
22. Blue River, 276 P.2d at 996.
23. A water conservation district created under COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-46-101 (2009).
24. Blue River, 276 P.2d at 997.
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25
considering claims for conditional decrees.

Dismissing the River District's argument, the court found that both
parties presented witnesses "as to Denver's future water requirements,"
and although they "were not in agreement, there was substantial
evidence to support a finding of future need for water from the Blue
River within a reasonable time." 26 The court concluded that "[t]his
[was] amply confirmed by the City's rapid subsequent growth."27
C.

THE EAGLE RIVER APPROPRIATIONS

In the 1950s, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered strictly to the
great and growing cities doctrine in cases regarding governmental
In Metropolitan
agencies appropriating future water supplies:
Suburban Water Users Ass'n. v. Colorado River Water Conservation
District ('Metropolitan Suburban'), the Colorado Supreme Court
found that the trial court inappropriately overrode the "studied goodfaith opinions of governmental agencies as to future needs .... "when it
denied various governmental agencies' claims for water for future use.
In September of 1956, the Metropolitan Suburban Water Users

Association ("Association"),29 the cities of Aurora and Colorado Springs
which are located adjacent to and south of Denver respectively,
petitioned the District Court of Eagle County to adjudicate pending
claims for water rights in Water District 37.3' These parties all claimed
conditional water rights to divert waters of the Eagle River through the

After the
Homestake Tunnel to the Arkansas River Basin.31
supplemental general adjudication commenced, the River District filed
a claim on November 14, 1956, for the Red Cliff Project, which
consisted of a system of reservoirs, ditches, power conduits, and other
facilities that would divert water on the Eagle River and its tributaries,
In January 1957, the Denver Water
including Homestake Creek.32
Board filed a claim to divert waters of the Eagle River through the
proposed Vail'Pass Tunnel to Dillon Reservoir, a storage reservoir that is

25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo.River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 289-90 (Colo. 1961).
29. The Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association was a private nonprofit
corporation formed by John P. Elliott to acquire, own, purchase and sell water rights
associated with his original filings for the proposed Homestake Project. See DAVID F.
JOHN P. ELLIOTr, OWEN MOORE, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF
METROPOLITAN WATER USERS ASSOCIATION (May 16, 1956); Test. John. P. Elliott, In the

LAWRENCE,

Matter of the Adjudication of Water Rights in District 37, No. 1193 (Sept. 24, 1956)
(recounting John P. Elliott's involvement with water diversions for the Homestake
Water Project).
30. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 275. Former Water District 37 consisted of all
lands lying in the state of Colorado irrigated by water taken from the Eagle River and its
tributaries. COLO. REV. STAT. §148-13-38 (1963).
31. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 275.
32. Id.at 276.
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part of the Roberts Tunnel Collection System.33 Additionally, in 1956,
the City of Pueblo filed a claim to divert Eagle River water to the
Arkansas River via the Otero Tennessee Pass Ditch.M
The River District opposed the claims of the Association, Colorado
Springs, Aurora, and Denver Water Board claiming that the
appropriations were speculative and not based on any reasonably
anticipated needs.35 With the exception of the City of Pueblo's claim,
the trial court denied the claims of the Association, Colorado Springs,
Aurora, the Denver Water Board, and the River District in part because
the projects were speculative.36
As to the Association's claim for the Homestake Project, the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court based upon Section 6,
Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution37 and the 1919 conditional
water right statute. 8 The Colorado Supreme Court found that in
planning for a reasonable municipal water supply, municipalities should
make provisions for an adequate supply in years of minimum runoff
and maximum consumption, which was the case during the drought of
1954. 39 As to the trial court's apprehension that the projects were
speculative, the Colorado Supreme Court again referred to the
safeguards in the 1919 conditional water right statute and Taussig v.
Moffat Tunnel Development Co.,40 that no final decree can be awarded

until the water is actually put to beneficial use.41 Based on the record
before it, the court further found that Aurora's current water supply
was "wholly inadequate to meet its present needs, most of which are
being supplied on a year-to-year basis by Denver."4 2 The court reasoned
that:
Denver can at any time refuse to renew its one-year contract and can,
33. Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 277-78.
35. Id. at 278.
36. Id. at 279-80.
37. Id. at 281. The Court relied on Section 6 art. XVI of the Colorado Constitution,
which provides in relevant part: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6
(emphasis added).
38. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 281-82, 284. The 1919 conditional water right
"if it shall appear that any claimant at said
statute provides in relevant part:
proceedings, or his predecessors in tide and claim, has prosecuted his claims' of
appropriation and the financing and construction of his enterprise with reasonable

diligence under all the facts and circumstances surrounding and bearing upon such
claim of appropriation, the district court shall enter a decree fixing and determining

the priority of right of each such partially completed appropriation as of the date from
which such reasonable diligence shall be shown to have been exercised, and fixing the
maximum amount of water which such claimant shall be entitled to divert under said
priority for the purpose of perfecting his said appropriation..." Id. at 281-82 (emphasis
added). See also Ellis & DeBraal, supra note 7, at 472.
39. Metro. Suburban,365 P.2d at 283.
40. See Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co., 106 P.2d 363 (Colo.
1940).
41. Metro. Suburban,365 P.2d at 285

42. Id.at 283..
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even during the term of its contract, limit Aurora's supply if needed in
Denver. Aurora is at the mercy of Denver for its present water needs.
Testimony as to its probable enhanced future needs due to population
growth and increased per capita uses is convincing and
uncontradicted .
The court gave the City of Colorado Springs even greater leeway in
defining its need:
It is true that evidence with reference to the water needs of Colorado
Springs does not disclose as bleak a picture as that of Aurora.
However, it does disclose good reason for adding to its supply to guard
against shortages arising in dry years and in contemplation of
increased future needs. 44
On the River District's appeal regarding the trial court's denial of
the Red Cliff Project, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and determined that the River District's act of filing a claim for
the Red Cliff Project and the River District's opposition to other claims
was sufficient due diligence to initiate the appropriation. 5 As to the
speculative nature of the River District's project, the Colorado Supreme
Court admonished the trial court for substituting its judgment for that
of those charged with the duty of supplying adequate water for
municipalities and other public bodies.4 6
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the
Denver Water Board's claim for the extension of its Roberts Tunnel
Collection System. The court concluded that the trial court's findings
concerning the absence of proof of need and the speculative nature of
the project "are all matters of opinion and concerning which there
must be definite proof in the future. 4 7 Having stated this, the court
reiterated "courts should not intrude their own opinions to override the
studied good-faith opinions of governmental agencies as to future
needs of the public for facilities or commodities."'
In sum, a governmental agency could: (1) make an appropriation
based upon the maximum amount for its reasonably anticipated needs
including areas outside it boundaries; (2) lease surplus waters in excess
of its immediate needs outside its. municipal boundaries; and (3) base
its need for an appropriation on the need for an adequate supply in a
dry year such as 1954. In addition, courts gave deference to the
managerial judgment of these governmental agencies in their operation
of municipal water system. Then in 1969, things began to change.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
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II. THE PRIVATE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE
A. THE WATER RIGHT DETERMINATION AND ADMINISTRATION ACT OF

1969.
In 1968, the Colorado Legislative Council directed the state division
of natural resources to study and draft legislation concerning the
following water matters:
To investigate relationships in the areas where intermingled surface
and ground water are commonly used in conjunction with each other
on the same lands, or lands immediately adjoining, for the same
purpose of irrigation; to determine the need for and content of
egislation that would provide for integrated administration of all
diversions and uses of water within the state; protect all vested water
rights, conserve water resources for maximum beneficial use, and
permit full utilization of all waters in the state...

The draft legislation was to be ready when the General Assembly
convened in January of 1969 because "the maximum use of water in the
state is the dominant factor for the future development of Colorado
and the solution of water matters is crucial to this end."5 '
In 1969, the General Assembly adopted the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act").5 1 The
1969 Act modified the method of adjudicating water rights,5 2 created
water courts,53 expanded the involvement of the state engineer in the
establishment and administration of water rights, 4 and most
importantly, articulated new policies 55to encourage the maximum
utilization of the state's scarce resources.
49. COLO. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED WATER LEGISLATION 1,
Research Publication No. 143 (1968).
50. Id. at 5.
51. Water Rights and Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 1
(1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200) (1969 Act) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92101 to -602 (2009).
52. See id. at 1207-08.
53. Id. at 1204.
54. Id. at 1216-18.
55. Id. at 1200. In PagosaI, the Colorado Supreme Court described the importance
of maximum utilization under the 1969 Act: "The public's water resource is subject to
maximum utilization, a doctrine intended to make water available for as many decreed
uses as there is available supply." Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited (Pagosa1), 170 P.3d 307, 313-14 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); COLO .REv. STAT. §
37-92-102(1) (a) (2009); see also Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden,
44 P.3d 241, 245 (Colo. 2002). "Within the priority system, maximum utilization
spreads the benefit of the public's water resources to as many uses as possible, within
the limits of the physically available water supply, the constraints of interstate water
compacts, and the requirements of United States Supreme Court equitable
apportionment decrees. In turn, the objective of maximum use administration, under
the prior appropriation system, is to achieve "optimum use" in every appropriator's
utilization of the water." § 37-92-501(2) (e). "[A]ll rules and regulations shall have as
their objective the optimum use of water consistent with preservation of the priority
system of water rights." Id. "Maximum utilization does not mean that every ounce of
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Under the 1969 Act, the General Assembly defined appropriation as
"the diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state and the
application of the same to a beneficial use." 5 6 It defined beneficial use
as "the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made. ... " The 1969
Act made no reference to "speculation," nor did it require proof of
specific factors for a municipal conditional water right.
B. THE HUSTONCASE: A PRECURSOR TO THE ANTI-SPECULATION
DOCTRINE.

In City of Thornton v. Bjou Iragation Co.,58 the Colorado Supreme
Court cited to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
Tunnel Company ('idler"), as the seminal case defining the antiInterestingly, the Vidler anti-speculation
speculation doctrine.5 9
doctrine could also have been named the Huston doctrine as the Court
issued both opinions within a span of one week. 60
At the end of the year 1978, John Huston, Allan Leaffer and
Wallace Yaffe ('Joint Venturers") and Nedlog Technological Group,
Colorado Pacific Energy and Colorado Pacific Aztec, and Bob Johnston,
Jr. filed over 100 separate applications involving claims for thousands of
wells and over twenty million acre-feet of underground water rights in
all seven water divisions in the state. 6' The Southeastern, Northern, and
Southwestern Water Conservation Districts, along with the State
Engineer, successfully petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to
consolidate the applications for determination of common questions of
law.62 The court assigned a special water judge to determine the
common questions of law including the threshold question of whether
63
non-tributary waters in Colorado are subject to appropriation.
Another question before the court was whether non-tributary waters
outside the boundaries of designated ground water basins could be
appropriated by persons having no property interest in the surface, or
Colorado's natural stream water ought to be appropriated; optimum use can be
achieved only through proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental
and economic concerns." Pagosa I, 170 P3d. at 314. See Alamosa-LaJara Water Users
Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983); see also James N. Corbridge,
Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A Challenge for Colorado
Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 503, 506 (1998) ("Part III reviews some of the principles
of water measurement in the context of maximum utilization of Colorado's water
resources.").
56. 1969Act, at 1201.
57. Id.
58. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
59. Colo. River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Co., 594 P.2d 566
(Colo. 1979).
60. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston (Huston), 593 P.2d 1347,
(Colo. 1979) (issued April 16, 1979). See infra Part III.C
61. Huston, 593 P.2d at 1348-49.
62. Id. at 1348.
63. Id. at 1349.
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for use by persons other than the claimant or those whom the claimant
is authorized to represent. 64
As to the question whether the applications were speculative, the
Colorado Supreme Court remarked:
This court has held that a claim to surface water rights cannot be
predicated solely upon speculative purposes ....This court shortly will
announce its opinion inColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrictv.

Vidler Tunnel Co., 594 P.2d 566, (1979), which deals with the
question. The water judge will have the guidance of those cases in
addressing the related question of whether non-tributary waters
outside the boundaries of a designated ground water basin can be
or others whom the
appropriated except for use. by the respondents
65

respondents are authorized to represent.
One week later, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the Vidler
decision.
C. THE VDLER DOCTRINE.
In 1975, Herbert T. Young's6 6 Vidler Tunnel Water Company
('Vidler") filed an application under the 1969 Act for a 156,238 acrefeet storage right for Sheephorn Reservoir on the Colorado River in
Gore Canyon near the Town of Kremmling.6 7 Vidler planned to use
2,000 acre-feet to irrigate lands it owned or leased; the City of Golden
64. Id.at 1349. In Colorado, there are four classes of water: (1) surface water and
hydraulically connected ground water, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (2009); (2)
water within designated ground water, § 37-90-103(6) (a); (3) not-non tributary
groundwater, § 37-90-103(10.7); and (4) non-tributary groundwater, § 37-90-103(10.5).
Designated ground water is a statutory class of water that in its "natural course would
not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or ground
water in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground
water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years
preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designation of the basin, and
which in both cases is within the geographic boundaries of a designated ground water
basin." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (a) (2009).
65. Huston, 593 P.2d at 1354 (emphasis added).
66. In the late forties, Herbert T. Young, geologist, miner and water entrepreneur,
discovered a partially completed but abandoned railroad tunnel that ran from the
headwaters of Leavenworth Creek above Georgetown to the headwaters of Peru Creek,
a tributary to the Snake River, in Summit County. HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING
WATER RIGHTS AND CoNFLcTs, About the Author (2d ed. 2003). He bought the mining
claims, completed construction of the tunnel in 1968, and built a water collection
system on tributaries of Peru Creek to import water through the Vidler Tunnel to the
Front Range. Id. In 1973, Vidler Tunnel Water Company received a conditional water
right for importations through the tunnel into the headwaters of Clear Creek for
domestic, agricultural, industrial and municipal uses in the Front Range. Colo. River
Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Co. (Vidler), 594 P.2d 566, 566-67 (Colo.
1979). In 1979, notwithstanding the "longstanding view" against speculation, Water
Court Judge Lohr approved and decreed this claim. Id. at 567. In 2000, the City of
Golden acquired the Vidler Tunnel water rights. City of Golden, Vidler Tunnel and
Collection System, http://www.ci.golden.co.us/Page.asp?NavID=680 (last visited Feb. 8,
2010). Yet, the Company's application in 1975 for Sheephorn Reservoir on the
Colorado River made Vidler a familiar name.
67. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 567; YOUNG, supra note 66, at About the Author.
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had an option to purchase 2,000 acre-feet with a right of first refusal for
an additional 3,000 acre-feet, all conditioned on the success of the
project. Vidler planned to sell the remainder of the yield to various
Front Range municipalities based upon studies of future need in the
Front Range. 68 Notwithstanding the lack of any committed end use for
the water on the Front Range, Water Division No. 5 District CourtJudge
George Lohr granted a conditional water storage decree for the
appropriation .69

On appeal, however, except for the amount needed to irrigate lands
Vidler owned, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and held:
Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to
speculate. The right to appropriate is for use, not merely for profit.
As we read our constitution and statutes, they give no one the right to
preempt the development potential of water for the anticipated future
use of others not in privity of contract, or in any agency relationship,
with the developer regarding that use. To recognize conditional
decrees grounded on no interest beyond a desire to obtain water for
sale would-as a practical matter-discourage those who have need
and use for the water from developing it. Moreover, such a rule would
encourage those with vast monetary resources to monopolize, for
personal profit rather than for beneficial use, whatever
unappropriated water remains.70
This holding established the Vidler anti-speculation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the element of intent to appropriate cannot be
satisfied
if there is no intent to place the water to an actual beneficial
1
7

use.

Vidler stood out as a new Colorado Supreme Court judicial
precedent and a turning point in Colorado water law insofar as private
water speculators were concerned. Nevertheless, several decades later,
in City of Thornton v. Bjou, the Colorado Supreme Court attempted to
firm up the underpinning of the Vidler decision. 2 Justice Lohr, whose
decision to grant Iidler its appropriation was overturned by the
Colorado Supreme Court, cited City & County of Denver v. Colorado
River Water Conservation District ("Denver v. CRWCIJ') and Rocky
Mountain Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation District
("Rocky Mountain"), for the proposition that the anti-speculation
doctrine was not a new legal requirement but rather that it followed
"longstanding" principles of Colorado water law.73 Both cases, however,
68. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 567.
69. Id.at566,568.
70. Id.at 568-70.
71. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo. 2005); seegenerallyScottA. Clark and Alix
L.Joseph, Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-Speculation Doctrine: The Continuing
ImportanceofActual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 553, 555-556 (2006).
72. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
73. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730,
757 (Colo. 1985); Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservancy Dist.,
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were decided after /idler. Circularly, Denver v. CRWCD cited to Rocky
Mountain, and Rocky Mountain also quoted Vidler for the
"longstanding view that conditional decrees will not be granted to those
who cannot show more than a speculative or conjectural future
beneficial use."74 This discrepancy may lead some to wonder, whether
the "longstanding" view of the anti-speculation doctrine prior to /idler
was that expressed by Judge Lohr when he granted Vidler the decree
for Sheephorn Mountain Reservoir, or whether the "longstanding" view
of anti-speculation changed after the enactment of the 1969 Act as the
7
Colorado Supreme Court noted in Rocky Mountain?
"

D. 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE 1969 ACT.
In 1979, on the heels of 1Wdler and Huston I, the General Assembly
amended the definition of "appropriation" in the 1969 Act. 76 The
General Assembly amended the definition of appropriation in 1979 to
endorse the /idler intent requirement. 77 However, the "legislation also
recognized the need for a more flexible anti-speculation requirement
that would allow government agencies planning flexibility, the 'great
and growing cities' concept that had earlier been recognized in City &
County of Denver v. Sheriff.... and City & County of Denver v.
Northern Coiorado Water Conservancy District..."78
The 1979
Amendment to the 1969 Act revised the definition of "appropriation" to
provide:
(3) (a) "Appropriation" means the application of a specified portion of
the waters of the state to a beneficial use pursuant to the procedures
prescribed by law; but no appropriation of water, either absolute or
conditional, shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is
based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights
to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation, as evidenced by
either of the following:

(I) The purported appropriator of record does not have either a
legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such
interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation,
unless such appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact
for the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation.
646 P.2d 383, 388-89 (Colo. 1982); BJou, 926 P.2d at 1, 37. George Lohr was
appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court on December 14, 1979. See Lohr, George
E., Colorado Supreme Court Library, http://www.state.co.us/courts/sctlib/77.htm (last
visited on February 2, 2010).
74. Colo. River Water ConservationDist., 696 P.2d at 757; Rocky Mountain, 646 P.2d
at 388.
75. Rocky Mountain, 646 P.2d at 389.
76. COLO. REV. STAT § 37-92-103(3) (2009); COLORADO LEGiSLATrVE DRAFtING
OFFICE, DIGEST OF BILLs ENACTED BY THE FIFIY-SEcOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1979 FIRST

REGULAR SESSION, 162-63 (1979).
77. See§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).

78. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 n.6 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); see § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (II).
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(H) The purported appropriator of record does not have a specific
plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, and
control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses.79
"By amending the definition of appropriation, the General
Assembly reaffirmed the anti-speculation holding of idler to respond
to the Huston filings."80 However, the Amendment also exempted
governmental agencies from the requirement of having a legally vested
interest in the lands or facilities that the appropriation serves. 81 This
change had the effect of creating a distinction between private
Under the statutory
appropriators and governmental agencies.
definition, a private appropriator must have a legally vested interest or a
reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or
facilities the appropriation serves, but there is no such requirement for
a governmental agency. 82 The statute only requires a governmental
agency to have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise
capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for specific
beneficial uses.83 The governmental exception is not conditioned upon
whether the government acts in a proprietary function, whether it has a
conservation plan, whether its per capita consumption is reasonably
attainable, whether the amount of consumptive use is reasonably
necessary to serve the increased population, or when the water must be
placed to beneficial use.84 Thus, under the 1979 amendment, the
General Assembly exempted governments unconditionally from the
requirement of having either a legally vested interest or a reasonable
expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities the
appropriation serves, notwithstanding the doctrine of maximum
utilization.85 So theoretically, as long as a governmental agency has a
specific plan of providing service, it should not need firm contractual
commitments with those it intends to serve, even if its future customers
are outside its governmental boundaries.8 6

79. § 37-92-103(3) (2009) (emphasis added).
80. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 960 (Colo.
1995).
81. § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (I); see PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 314, n.6.
82. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I).
83. See id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).
84. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I).
85. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (1) (I); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d 307, 317 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (citing City of
Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1996).) (holding that the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine for conditional water
rights should be construed narrowly in order to meet Colorado's maximum utilization
goals).
86. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (H); see also Pagosa , 170 P.3d at 315 (citing BiJou, 926 P.2d at
38-39) (holding government agencies need not be certain of future needs and thus
may conditionally appropriate within a reasonable planning period, but the agencies
bear to burden to prove the plan is not speculative, and not conjectural future
population growth becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy).
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E. HUSTON II.
To complete the story of the attempted water grab by the
entrepreneurs John H. Huston, Wallace Yaffe, and Allan Leaffer, the
special water judge that the Colorado Supreme Court appointed held
that:
[n]ontributary ground water outside designated ground water basins
can be appropriated for the use of persons other than the claimant so
long as the claim is not speculative under the guidelines of our prior
cases, notably Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
Tunnel Water Co... Bunger v. Uncompahgre Valley Water Users
Ass'n . ..and Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co ...
87
On appeal, however, the court determined that nontributary
ground water was not subject to appropriation under the Colorado
Constitution or under the 1969 Act and dismissed the applications.8 8 As
to the trial judge's ruling regarding the Vidler test, the Colorado
Supreme Court declined to offer an advisory opinion "because of the
impossibility of foreseeing and providing for every possible type of
arrangement between applicants and landowners or between applicants
and users of the water.'
The Colorado Supreme Court later applied the Vidler antispeculation test to nontributary water in a designated groundwater
basin, 90 and to designated basin ground waters in the aquifers of the
Denver Basin. 9'
However, in East Cherry Creek Valley Water &
Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District, the Colorado
Supreme Court determined that since the appropriation doctrine did
not apply to nontributary ground waters outside designated basins,
neither did the anti-speculation doctrine. 92 The court concluded that
under Senate Bill 5, the legislature specifically intended "to permit
adjudications for future uses without a corresponding obligation to
develop them," 3 unlike the statutory scheme for designated ground
water, which did "not evince any intent to permit adjudication of a use
right without plans for development and use of the resource.'

87. State Dep't of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294,
1302 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) cert. denied,466 U.S. 944 (1984).
88. Id. at 1310, superseded by 1983 COLO. SESS. LAws 2080 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (1), (2009)) as recognized in Qualls, Inc. v. Berryman, 798
P.2d 1095, 1098 (Colo. 1990) (en banc).
89. State Dep't., 671 P.2d at 1319.
90. Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 523 (Colo. 1987).
91. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 78-79 (Colo. 2003).
92. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d 154, 157-58 (Colo. 2005).
93. Id. at 158-59 (citing SB 5, ch. 285, sec. 3 § 37-90-137 (July 1, 1985), 1985 COLO.
SESS. LAws 1160 (codified as amended at section 37-90-137, COLO. REV. STAT. (2009))).
94. Id.
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m. POST VTDLER MUNICIPAL EXCEPTION TO THE ANTISPECUIATION DOCTRINE
A. DENVER WATER BOARD'S PINEY, STRAIGHT CREEK AND EAGLE-

COLORADO PROJECTS

In City & County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservaton
District, Justice Lohr again applied the Vidler doctrine to a
governmental agency application in apparent disregard of the 1979
statutory exemption. In Denver v. CRWCD, the Denver Water Board
filed statements of claim in 1968 and 1971 for conditional water rights
for Straight Creek (a tributary to the Blue River), Piney River, and the
Eagle-Colorado Collection System. 96 In 1972, the Denver Water Board
put on evidence that it anticipated that it would serve a 1,000 square
mile area in the Denver Metropolitan Area.97 The water court
appointed a referee who made extensive factual findings, including
ones that the appropriation was solely for use outside the municipal
boundaries of Denver; that such use is of some benefit to the residents
of Denver; and the claimed amounts come from projected future
population growth in the Denver Metropolitan Area.98 However, the
referee entered an interlocutory decree denying the Denver Water
Board's claims concluding that the Denver Water Board was without
legal authority or capacity to appropriate water solely for use outside its
municipal boundaries. 99 Thus, the Denver Water Board could not have
formed the requisite intent for a valid appropriation. 100 Accordingly, the
water judge approved and confirmed the interlocutory decree.'l 1
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the water court
and held that the Denver Water Board did have the constitutional and
statutory authority to make an appropriation for use outside the city
boundaries. 0 2 As a matter of local concern, Denver's Charter under
section 6 Article XX of the Colorado State Constitution authorized the
Denver Water Board to provide water outside its boundaries. 10 3 The
court determined, however, that Denver acts in its "proprietary
capacity" when providing water outside its boundaries, thus triggering

95. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730,
756-57 (Colo. 1985).
96. Id. at 734-36.
97. MIcHAEL D. WHITE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER REFEREE, 27, Civil Action Nos.
2371, 1529 and 1548 (April 3, 1978) (including testimony ofJames L. Oglivie, Secretary
Manager of the Denver Water Department, who on April 24, 1972 described the
borders of a 1,000 square mile service area which he anticipated that Denver would
eventually supply).
98. Colo. River Water ConservationDist., 696 P.2d at 737, 741, 757.
99. Id. at 737.
100. Id. at 757.
101. Id.at 737-38.
102. Id. at 742, 745.
103. Id. at 744-45.
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review of whether, as a matter of statewide concern, the state had
authorized such appropriations. 10 4 Nonetheless, the Colorado Supreme
Court concluded the General Assembly had expressly authorized this
extraterritorial water service by statute and reversed the water court.0 5
Based on its finding that Denver acts in a proprietary capacity when
it serves water extraterritorially,0 6 the Colorado Supreme Court held
evidence of firm contractual commitments -was missing and remanded
the case back to the water court to take evidence on the 1979 Vidler
doctrine. 10 7 The court noted there was no evidence that the water
court, the parties, or the amicus considered the application of Vidler to
the claims. 10 However, the opinion did not explain why the court did
not consider the application of the statutory exemption. That would
come later from Justice Lohr in Bifou.
Thus, disregarding section 37-92-103 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, the Colorado Supreme Court formulated the following antispeculation test specifically for the Denver Water Board:
Denver could not have formed the necessary intent to appropriate any
particular amount of water for use until it had plans to use that water
within its own boundaries, firm contractual commitments to supply
that water to users outside its boundaries, or agency relationships with
such users, evidence must be taken and a finding made as to the
amount of the claimed water, if any, that is committed by contract or
agency agreement
and on what dates those commitments came into
09
existence.
B. CITY OF THORNTON'S NORTHERN PROJECT.
In 1986, the City of Thornton filed for conditional water rights for a
water supply project that would yield up to 67,000 acre-feet in three
phases over 70 years. 1 Thornton provided evidence that its supply was
26,000 acre-feet, and it anticipated needing 93,000 acre-feet' to serve a
projected population of 379,000 by the year 2056.'12 Thornton's13
projections of growth included areas not within its present city limits.

The water court confirmed Thornton's projections were "optimistic"
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 742.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757 n.18.
Id. at 757.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 19-21 (Colo. 1996).
Thornton based its projected need, in part, on a 10% safety factor and 15%

factor accounting for distribution losses. Testimony of Walid Hajj, Case No. 86CW401,
86CW402, 86CW403 and 87CW332, March 31, 1992, p. 90, 91.
112. Id.at19,40.
113. Id. at 40. ("A municipality may take into consideration facts indicating that its
physical area is likely to expand in the course of growth. Planning need not be limited
to current geographic limits if there is reasonable expectation that those limits will
expand.") Id.
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but not speculative.114 Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
and the City of Fort Collins appealed on numerous grounds. On the
issue of need, they argued Thornton's plan violated the anti-speculation
doctrine because it failed to prove it had firm contractual commitments
or agency relationships for water service outside its boundaries. 1 5
Because W/idler involved a private corporation, the Colorado
Supreme Court re-examined Sheriffand Blue River to determine if the
anti-speculation doctrine applied to municipalities. 16
The court
concluded that Sheriff"clearly counsels against a strict application of
the anti-speculation doctrine to municipalities seeking to provide for
the future needs of their constituents," and under Blue River, "a city
may appropriate water for its future needs without violating the
prohibition on speculation so long as the amount of the approriation
is in line with the city's 'reasonably anticipated requirements. ' ,,I17 Since
W/idler involved a private corporation, the requirement of firm
contractual commitments or agency relationships did not apply with
equal force to municipalities." 8 The General Assembly's action in 1979
supported this limited exception to the Vidler requirements but did not
completely immunize
municipal
applicants
from speculation
challenges. 119
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court offered this
construction of the municipal anti-speculation doctrine:
[U]nder section 37-92-103(3)(a), a municipality may be decreed
conditional water rights based solely on its projected future needs, and
without firm contractual commitments or agency relationships, but a
municipality's entitlement to such a decree is subject to the water
court's determination that the amount conditionally appropriated is
consistent with the municipality's reasonably anticipated
requirements
120
based on substantiated projections of future growth.
The court explained that this construction of the municipal antispeculation doctrine was consistent with cases decided after the
enactment of section 37-92-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
however, the doctrine was not consistent with the holding in Denver
v.
21
Doctrine.
Non-Non-Speculation
Not
the
to
us
brings
which
CRWCD,
C. THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION TO THE ANTI-SPECULATION

DOCTRINE.
In Biou, the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("Northern") argued that the City of Thornton, under Denver v.
CRWCD, must comply with the V/idler test even though the City of
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at41.
Id.at 36, 39.
Id.at 37-38.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
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Thornton was a governmental entity entitled to the municipal
exception. 122 Northern argued that the word "boundaries," as Denver v.
CRWCD applied it, meant the city's boundaries at the time of the
application, rather than the reasonably anticipated future boundaries of
2 3 Thus, Northern contended that the holding
the municipal applicant."
in Denver v. CRWCD precludes municipalities from appropriating water
based on projected requirements for future growth areas outside the
current municipal boundaries. 12 4 The Colorado Supreme Court noted
that if a city could only plan for use within existing boundaries, it would
remove municipal flexibility to plan for future water needs and
undercut its previous decisions in Sheriff and Blue River.'25 So the
court backtracked in BJou, and distinguished Denver v. CRWCD as
unique to the facts in that case, deciding the Denver Water Board
sought to apropriate water to sell for profit to parties outside its own
boundaries. 6 The court explained that the Denver Water Board acted
"in the capacity of a water supplier on the open market rather than as a
governmental entity seeking to ensure future water supplies for its
citizens."' 27
The municipal 'planning exception was therefore
unavailable to the Denver Water Board, which was "required to comply
with the full range of requirements applicable to private parties under
Vidler."128 Thus, the court established the exception to the exception
to the anti-speculation doctrine that would apply to any governmental
agency that "profits" from the sale of water outside its boundaries.
However, the unique facts of Denver v. CRWCD, as the court in
Bijou described them, were not quite accurate. In Denver v. CRWCD,
the Colorado Supreme Court characterized the Denver Water Board's
lease of water outside its boundaries as "proprietary" to determine
whether the General Assembly had authorized extraterritorial water
service. 129 But neither the special master referee, trial court, nor the
Colorado Supreme Court in Denver v. CRWCD considered evidence, or
made a finding that the Denver Water Board sold water for "profit" as
Vidler used that term. The Denver Water Board's rates and revenues
derive from the city's charter obligation to recover the full cost of
service. 3 ° Denver's city charter requires the Denver Water Board to
charge an additional amount for water leased outside the city,' but
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.at 40.
Id.
Id.

129. Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver,
928 P.2d 1254, 1266 (Colo. 1996).
130. Id. at 1270.
131. Charter of the City & County of Denver art. X, § 10.1.13 "Water Leases,"
available at http://www.denverwater.org/OperatingRules/OperRulesArticleX/
("The
Board shall have power to lease water and water rights for use outside the territorial
limits of the City and County of Denver, but such leases shall provide for limitations of
delivery of water to whatever extent may be necessary to enable the Board to provide an
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such charges simply reimburse the citizens of Denver for the use of its
system.13 2 The Denver Water Board, as a governmental entity, does not
"profit" as that term was used in idler,and certainly no member of the
Denver Water Board personally profits. ' Further, when the Denver
Water Board supplies water in its proprietary capacity outside its
boundaries, it remains a public utility for public use.
In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver v. CRWCD did
not consider the statutory governmental exemption of 1979.135 Because
the claims were filed prior to the enactment of 1969 Act, the provisions
of the 1969 Act, including the governmental exemption to the antispeculation doctrine of 1979, did not apply and Denver v. CRWCD did
not consider them. 3 6 The Denver Water Board, as a governmental
agency, should have been given wide latitude under the 1919
conditional water right statute and cases (including Sherif, Blue River,
and MetropolitanSuburban) decided under the 1919 Act, to determine
its reasonable needs outside its municipal boundaries, rather than the
private speculator test that the court applied in idler.
The City and County of Denver could still annex property outside of
its boundaries.
Even though the1974 Poundstone Amendment 3 v

adequate supply of water to the people of Denver. Every such lease shall contain terms
to secure payment of sufficient money to fully reimburse the people of Denver for the
cost of furnishing the water together with an additional amount to be determined by
the Board.").
132. Bennett, 928 P.2d at 1272 n.27 (The additional amount recovers the costs that
Denver citizens incur for the capital they have invested in utility assets used to provide
service to outside city customers).
133. Charter of the City and County of Denver art. X, §§ 10.1.2-3 available at
http://www.denverwater.org/OperatingRules/OperRulesArticleX/ (The Denver Water
Board created under the Denver City Charter has no shareholders. The Mayor of
Denver appoints the Board Members, who are compensated $600.00 per year).
134. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718
P.2d 235, 244-46 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the Denver Water Board is a non-regulated
public utility when supplying water to customers inside and outside of Denver's
territorial limits); City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382,
391 (1978).
135. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2009).
136. See City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d
730, 739-40 (Colo. 1985). In Byou the Supreme Court gave a partial explanation of the
inapplicability of the governmental exemption, stating that the exemption "was enacted
in 1979, more than ten years after the City of Denver applied" for a decree for the
conditional water rights. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 40 n.27
(Colo. 1996). While this statement is accurate, the more encompassing reason is that
the 1943 and 1919 Acts, as opposed to the 1969 Act, governed the entire original
proceeding.
137. To address the federal court's plan to integrate the tri-ethnic area through
bussing and other programs, the City and County of Denver attempted to extend its
boundaries through annexation.
In response, Greenwood Village Mayor Freda
Poundstone drafted an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that required any
annexation by one county of land in another county to be voted on by all citizens in the
county giving up the land. Effectively, the amendment prevented Denver from
annexing surrounding neighborhoods to be included in the desegregation effort. See
COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1; see generally Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 380 F. Supp. 673, 684, 690-91 (D. Colo. 1974); see generally
Tom 1. Romero, II, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of
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constrained Denver's ability to annex areas outside its boundaries, it did
not prohibit Denver from annexing land, as when Denver annexed
forty-five square miles for the Denver International Airport in 1988.13a
Finally, the Denver Water Board's proprietary actions of leasing
water outside its boundaries did not seem to trouble the Colorado
Supreme Court in Sheriff,Blue River, or MetropolitanSuburban. None
of these cases applied a Vidler type common law test; rather, the court
confirmed Denver Water Board's appropriations based upon its
anticipated needs, including amounts necessary to serve adjacent areas
in the metropolitan
area without a requirement of firm contractual
139
commitments.

So, with Biou, despite a clear statutory exception from the General
Assembly limiting governmental agencies' burden of proof in
demonstrating a non-speculative appropriation, the Colorado Supreme
Court created an exception to the exception to the anti-speculation
doctrine, essentially applicable to a single water user within the state.14 °
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO PAGOSA
A. DROUGHT OF 2002

In the years preceding the Court's decision in PagosaI and Pagosa
II, Colorado experienced a severe hydrologic drought which
precipitated the enactment of several pieces of legislation considered by
the Court in its Pagosa decisions. In 2002, Colorado experienced
one of the worst single-year droughts in its recorded history. 141 Storage
reserves in Lake Powell dropped dramatically, triggering anxieties in
the upper Colorado River basin that downstream states would place a
compact call. 142 Denver Water Board's storage reserves dropped to

Colorado'sLega Past,73 U. COLO. L. REv. 521, 579-84 (2002).
138. In May 1988, voters in Adams County approved the City and County of Denver's

annexation of approximately 45 square miles for an international airport.

CATHERINE

KRAFT, ELECTIONS ADMIN., ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST AT THE SPEcIAL ELECTION ON THE
AIRPORTAGREEMENT, May 17, 1988.

139. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566,
568 (Colo. 1979); Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 283, 287-88 (Colo. 1961); City & County of Denver v.
N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 999 (Colo. 1954); City & County of
Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840-41 (Colo. 1939).
140. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (2009); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation
Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 39-40 (Colo. 1996).
141. COLO.
Div.
OF
WATER
RES.,
2002 ANN.
REP.,
available at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/annualreport/annlrpt_2002.PDF (last visited on Feb. 1,
2010); see also Connie A. Woodhouse, A Paleo Perspectiveon Hydroclimatic Variability
in the Western United States, 66 AQUATIC Sx. 346, 349 (2004) (stating that the severity
of the Colorado 2002 drought was matched or exceeded about eight times during the
300 year study period).
142. Bureau of Reclamation, Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin, Mar. 17,
2010, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/feature/drought.html (last visited March 31, 2010).
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approximately 45% of capacity.1 43 The dilemma for most governing
bodies is how to plan for the unknown. In 2002, the governing bodies
had to grapple with the unknowns of drought severity and duration. 4 4
Droughts test the accuracy of previous planning departments'
determinations of an adequate water supply, the failure of which can
spell disaster for any community -large or small.
B. THE STATEJUMPS INTO WATER SUPPLY PLANNING.

Beginning in 2003, the General Assembly enacted various water
related legislation in reaction to the 2002 drought. In 2003, the
General Assembly authorized three million dollars for the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") to investigate all aspects of water
supply and water demand through the year 2030 in each river basin of
the state.145
The overall objective of the Statewide Water Supply
Initiative ("SWSI") was to help Colorado "maintain an adequate water
supply for its citizens and the environment."14 6 Because of the divisive
nature of water issues in the West and in Colorado in particular, the
study established certain ground rules including the acknowledgement
147
that SWSI was "not [to] take the place of local water planning.
In 2004, the General Assembly amended the Water Conservation
Act of 1991 by an act concerning water planning by retail water
providers to promote wise water use, conservation, and drought
planning by public and private agencies, as well as encourage and
support execution of this act that relates to the development and into
the statewide water supply initiative. 48 The statute still allows water
providers to determine the manner in which they develop, adopt, make
publicly available, and implement a conservation plan. 4
Following the momentum initiated by SWSI, the General Assembly
enacted the Colorado Water for the 21st Century Act in 2005.150
Intending to "facilitate discussion and negotiations between basins on
water management issues, and to encourage locally driven collaborative
solutions to water supply challenges... ," the General Assembly created
an interbasin compact committee and nine basin roundtables 51 The
143. See Denver Water, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report C-12 (2002)
available
at
http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/E6522765-BCDF-1B42D942C93720CCOED0/AnnualReport2002l.pdf.
144. National
Drought
Mitigation
Center,
Monitoring
Drought,
http://drought.unl.edu/monitor (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
145. Act of May 19, 2003, ch. 269, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1768.
146. Colo.
Dep't
of
Natural
Res.,
SWSI
&
Technical Resources,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WIvMD/SWSITechnicalResources/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
147. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Statewide Water Supply Initiative Executive
Summary,
Nov.
2003,
at
ES
3,
available
at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/7D87609A-1CE6-4E16-ABF4DD34878FOE33/0/ExecSummaryReportl l1504.pdf [hereinafter
Colorado Water
Conservation Board, Executive].
148. Act ofJune, 4, 2004, ch. 373, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1777.
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-126(3) (2009).
150. Act ofJune, 4, 2004, ch. 314, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1472.
151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-75-104(1) (a) (2009).
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General Assembly authorized each roundtable to use the data and
information derived from SWSI to develop a basin-wide consumptive
and non- consumptive water supply needs assessment, to quantify the
amount of available unappropriated water within each basin, and to
propose projects or methods for meeting the consumptive and nonconsumptive water supply needs identified in the assessment.'52
However, the General Assembly did not authorize the roundtables to
construct or operate water supply systems or remove water from the
those activities to
streams to supply its water needs, leaving
15
municipalities and other governmental entities. 7
Then in 2008, apparently concerned that local governments were
granting land development permits based upon inadequate water
supplies, the General Assembly added a section to the Local
Government Regulation of Land Use to require consideration of the
adequacy of water supply before granting development.15 4 The General
Assembly found that securing an adequate supply of water to serve a
land development can have a broad regional impact within and
between river basins. Thus, it was imperative that local governments
receive reliable information concerning the adequacy of the proposed
developers' water supply. 55 So, the General Assembly declared that
"while land use and development approval decisions are matters of local
concern," the local governments must consider certain information in
its determination of whether the water supply for the proposed
developer is adequate under its sole discretion. 156 The General
Assembly also required:
[I]f the water for the proposed development is to be provided by a
water supply entity that has a water supply plan that: (a) Has been
reviewed and updated, if appropriate, within the previous ten years by
the governing board of the water supply entity; (b) Has a minimum
twenty-year planning horizon; (c) Lists conservation measures, if any,
that may be implemented within the service, area; (d) Lists the water
demand management measures, if any, that may be implemented
within the service area; (e) Includes a general description of water
supply entity's water obligations; (f) Includes a general description of
the water supply entity's water supplies; and (g) Is on file with the local
government.
In June 2009, the CWCB issued a draft study extending the SWSI
study to the year 2050, pursuant to a request by the Western Slope basin

152. Id.§ 37-75-104(2)(c).
153. Instead, the General Assembly authorized local entities to develop water supply

systems. See § 31-35-402.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 29-20-304(1) (a).
Id. § 29-20-301(1) (a).
Id. §§ 29-20-301(1) (b), 29-20-305(1).
Id. § 29-20-304(3).
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roundtables.'5 8 The study extended the population and water use
projections to 2050, updated the per capita use estimates, and revised
the Self-Supplied Industrial forecast.15 9However, SWSI acknowledged
that providing water for municipal and agricultural users is the purview
of local water providers and that SWSI does not take the place of local
water planning.1 60 In the land use statute, the General Assembly left the
determination of a sufficient water supply to the sole discretion of the
local government.' 6
V.

PAGOSA

A. PAGOSA I THE COURT'S FIRST FORAY INTO JUDICIAL WATER SUPPLY
PLANNING
162
Remember Pagosa?Thisis a song about Pagosa.
In Pagosa I the Colorado Supreme Court faced the questions of
whether, as a matter of law, a government agency may obtain water
163
rights in amounts premised on growth 100 years into the future;
whether the applicants, the Pagosa Water & Sanitation District
("Pagosa") and San Juan Water Conservancy District ("San Juan")
(collectively referred to as the "Districts"), put on sufficient evidence to
substantiate their reasonably anticipated requirements for their
appropriation, including population projections and per capita water
usage; 64 and whether Pagosa and San Juan demonstrated a sufficient
to appropriate water rights in the amounts and for the
intent necessary
15
uses it sought.
In 2003, Pagosa's water resource engineer recommended that
Pagosa apply for conditional water rights sufficient to fill the proposed
66
Dry Gulch Reservoir to the maximum possible size of 35,000 acre-feet.
Pagosa's engineer testified it was a "no brainer" to go for the maximum
site capacity based upon economies of scale.167 To make the engineer's
"no brainer" recommendation fit the Biou standard, Pagosa put on
evidence that this supply of water would meet a need based upon a 100-

158. Colorado Water Conservation Board, State of Colorado 2050 Municipal and
(draft
2009),
Projections
ES-I
Water
use
Industrial
http://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/C28C7EOF-0374-4982-8BOE138C8851BD2F/0/2050MIDemands2O5ODraftReportFull.pdf [hereinafter Projections].
159. Id. at ES-2.
160. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Projections,supra note 158, at ES-I.
161. § 29-20-303(1).
162. See AP.Lo Gul RiE, Alice's Restaurant,on ALICE's RESTAURANT (Appleseed Music
Inc. 1966) ("Remember Alice? It's a song about Alice.").
163. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 309 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.at 311.
167. Id.
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The water court then confirmed an
year planning period.16
appropriation for Pagosa and San Juan for a water storage right at Dry
Gulch Reservoir in the amount of 29,000 acre-feet and an eighty cfs
direct flow right from the San Juan River. 169 Trout Unlimited ('TU")
appealed, 70 claiming the amount awarded was more than Pagosa or
San Juan could reasonably anticipate using over a reasonable period of
anti-speculation doctrine. 7 ' The Colorado
time in violation of the
72
Supreme Court agreed. 1

Writing for the majority, Justice Hobbs held that "[b]ased on
Colorado's statutory requirements and Bjou, the limited governmental
agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine should be construed
narrowly, in order to meet the state's maximum utilization and
optimum beneficial use goals. " 173 He continued, "Although the fifty
year planning period... we approved in Bjou is not a fixed upper
limit, and each case depends on its own facts, the water court should
closely scrutinize a governmental agency's claim for a planning period
that exceeds fifty years." 1 74 Concerned that a municipality's long term
planning horizon could preclude other legitimate water uses and avoid
the state's maximum utilization and optimum beneficial use goals, the
court established a municipal duty of water. 175 Rather than using the
tunnels, reservoirs, pipes and pipelines designed by the municipality,
duty of water is now measured by the following
the municipal
76
elements?

(1) what is a reasonable water supply planning period;
(2) what are the substantiated population projections based on a
normal rate of growth for that period; and
(3) what amount of available unappropriated water is reasonably
necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the governmental
agency for the planning period, above its current water supply.177
"In addition, [a governmental agency] must show under the "can
and will" test that it can and will put the conditionally appropriated
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.at 310-11.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.at 317.
Id.

175. Id.at 315. As to agricultural irrigation "duty of water" is "that measure of water,
which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be
applied to any given tract of land for such period of time as may be adequate to'

produce therefrom a maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.
It is not a hard and fast unit of measurement, but is variable according to conditions."
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo.
1954).

176. An element is a required part of where the non-establishment of that fact to the
required burden of proof is fatal to the case. Thus, if the Applicant fails to put on proof
of the Pagosa elements, then the applicant failed to meet its burden of proof and the

application must be dismissed. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. United States,
891 P.2d 952, 961 n.9 (Colo. 1995).
177. Pagosa , 170 P.3d at 313.
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water to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time. '178 The court
also articulated
four factors to assist the court in its determination of
179
the elements:
(1) implementation of reasonable water conservation measures for
the planning period;
(2) reasonably expected land use mixes during that period;
(3) reasonably attainable per capita usage projections for indoor
and outdoor use based on the land use mixes for that period; and
(4) the amount of consumptive use reasonably necessary for use
through the
conditional appropriation to serve the increased
180
population.
With this holding, the majority narrowly construed the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine by
inferring that a planning period longer than 50 years was
unreasonable. 181 -In doing so, the court effectively fashioned a new
planning standard allowing its opinion to "override the studied goodfaith opinions" of Pagosa and San Juan "as to future needs of the public
for facilities or commodities.'182
Reluctantly concurring in the judgment, Justice Coats took
exception with the majority on the issue of the planning period. He
pointed out the "can and will" standard still requires a reasonable time
frame to develop the facilities necessary to place the waters to beneficial
use.'8 3 He expressed concern that the majority derived the fifty year
planning period from a very complex project and that courts should
not presumptively apply the same planning period to less complicated
projects.'84 Justices Eid and Rice, on the other hand, concurred in the
result but were troubled that the majority's "narrow construction" of
Biou would deprive municipalities of the "longstanding recognition" of
the need for flexibility to plan for future water needs. 85 They even
suggested that it may be necessary to modify or reconsider the Bijou
framework. 186 The court then remanded the case back to the water
178. Id. "No claim for a water right may be recognized or a decree therefore granted
except to the extent that it is established that the waters can be and will be diverted,
stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used
and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable
time." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305 (9) (b) (2009).
179. Factors are facts that are not required to prove the case but which courts can
consider in determining whether the applicant has established the amount of available
water that is reasonably necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agency for the planning period above its current supply. Failure of the
applicant to present evidence concerning such factors can be considered by the court in
determining whether the elements have been met, but such failure is not in themselves
dispositive. SeeArapahoe,891 P.2d at 961 n.9.
180. PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 317.
181. PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 318.
182. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 289 (Colo. 1961).
183. Pagosa1, 170 P.3d at 320 (Coats, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 321.
185. Id at 322-323 (Eid,J., concurring).
186. Id. at 323.
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court with instructions that it:
[S]hould examine the evidence utilizing the elements applicable to
determining whether the districts have met their burden for a nonspeculative conditional appropriation, accompany its judgment with
sufficient findings of fact based on the evidence, and fashion
appropriate decree provisions, which may include "reality checks" and
volumetric limitations
provisions for the districts' conditional
187
appropriation.

B. PAGOSA HL THEJUDICIARY'S SECOND FORAYINTO MUNICIPAL
PLANNING
On remand, Pagosa and San Juan did not offer any additional
evidence, and the court refused TU's request to present additional
evidence.1 8 8 In considering the evidence from Pagosa I and the
instructions from the Colorado Supreme Court, the water court:
1s9
(1) entered a decree based upon a fifty year planning horizon;
(2) reduced the conditional storage right to 19,300 acre-feet with a refill
right for an additional 6,000 acre-feet; 9 (3) confirmed an appropriation
for a direct right of fifty cfs to meet instantaneous demands;' 1 and
(4) imposed reality checks in subsequent diligence proceedings to
monitor actual growth in equivalent units, actual per capita usage,
federal bypass requirements, and effects of climate change. 9 Again TU
appealed, claiming that Pagosa and San Juan failed to (1) substantiate
population projections based upon a normal rate of growth; (2)
establish the reasonableness of the fifty year planning horizon period;
and (3) establish that the decreed amounts of water are reasonably
necessary to serve the projected population through 2055.193
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the fifty year
planning period because of findings of the lengthy lead time for land
acquisition, environmental field studies, design and engineering,
permitting, financing, constructing, and filling the reservoir; the court
further held that the state's statewide water supply planning process
extended to the year 2050.1" However, the court determined that the
existing record did not contain sufficient evidence to justify (1)
recreational in-channel, instream flow and hypothetical federal bypass
flow requirements; (2) fifty cfs direct flow diversion; and (3) a storage

187. Id. at 320.
188. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I1), 219 P.3d
774, 777-79 (Colo. 2009).
189. Judgment and Decree, Case No. 2004CW085, 7 (Colo. Dist. Court, Water
Division 7, 2008).
190. Id. at 10.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 13-14.
193. PagosaII, 219 P.3d at 776.
194. Id. at 780-81.
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right of 25,300 acre-feet.
On remand, the Colorado Supreme Court directed the trial court to
take additional evidence that, when considering the 2055 planning
period, it can justify (1) a recreational in-channel, instream flow,
and/or a bypass flow; (2) and independent direct flow diversion water
right; and (3) a storage right of 25,300 acre-feet. 196 The court provided
guidance that based the direct flow right upon the "amount of water
reasonably necessary... to meet seasonal peak demand and potential
outages impeding Dry Gulch Reservoir deliveries into the District's
197
water system," unless other evidence justified a different amount.
The court concluded the record contained evidence supporting the
2055 planning period, the 200 gallons per capita usage number, and
that carryover storage may be necessary to meet their reasonably
anticipated needs including a safety supply margin, recreation,
piscatorial and wildlife uses; but that the remand decree did not address
the projected land use mix of the City of Pagosa Springs or of Archuleta
County. 198 Because the projected land use mix affects the per capita
water usage in the long term, it affects the calculation of the reasonable
amounts of water necessary for the applicants in the study period. 99
In support of its land use factor, the court referenced the 2008 land
use legislation as complementing the elements and factors referenced
in PagosaL200 Then, the court went outside the record and considered
the 2009 draft of 2050 population and municipal and industrial use
projections of the General Assembly's statewide planning process even
though the original study was "not to take the place of local water
planning."20 ' The Colorado Supreme Court directed the water court on
remand to make a finding on the amount of annual dry year yield
available from the District's existing water rights. 20 2 During its
instruction at trial, the court instructed the water court to address the
methodology and results of the 2009 draft SWSI study along with all
other evidence of population projections and water supply needs for
the District's 2055 water needs. °
Finally, the court rejected the amici and District's arguments that
governmental agencies act in a legislative capacity when they make
conditional water appropriations and thus are entitled to deference to
the claimed amounts of water the suppliers deem reasonably necessary
for their future use. 204 According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the
only accommodation the General Assembly made to governmental
195. Id. at 781, 784-85.
196. Id.at 788.
197. Id.at 784.
198. Id. at 785.
199. Id. at 785-86.
200. Id. at 786; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-301 to -306 (2009).
201. PagosaII, 219 P.3d at 786; Colorado Water Conservation Board, Executive, supra
note 147 at 3.
202. PagosaII. 219 at 788.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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water suppliers is to allow "conditional appropriations to be made and
decreed for a future reasonable
water supply period in reasonably
205
anticipated amounts[.]

C. THE PAGOSA FACTORS INTRUDE UPON GOVERNMENTAL DECISION
MAKING.

In most areas of the law, courts defer under the theory of separation
of powers to the policy determinations of the legislative and executive
branches of government. 2°6 In Colorado, courts have been reluctant to
substitute their udgment for that of the municipal decision maker in
)udmen
208
2210
zoning matters, annexations, rate making, 0 9 and condemnation.
Prior to the 1969 Act, the courts would not intrude upon governmental
agencies' decisions in matters that related to water planning. 211 Even
after the 1969 Act, Bjou cautioned courts to be sensitive not to
"inappropriately infringe 212
on the water management decisions of...
municipal water officials."
By suggesting the trial court make findings on the reasonableness of
conservation, land use mixes, per capita use, and the anticipated
consumptive use, the court entwined itself in municipal planning
functions. 2 3 Fundamentally, the factors intrude upon governmental
decision making and give rise to judicial legislation, which prior
decisions discouraged.2 14
The first pertinent factor, whether the applicant implemented
reasonable water conservation measures for the planning period, 215 is
205. Id.
206. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
207. Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Colo. 1960).
208. City & County of Denver v. Holmes, 400 P.2d 901, 904 (Colo. 1965).
209. Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver,
928 P.2d 1254, 1265 (Colo. 1996).
210. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-6-105 (2009); City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382, 394 (Colo. 1978). According to the dissent, the majority
allowed home rule municipalities to condemn water rights and water facilities regardless
of necessity as projected over a reasonable period of time, subject only to review for
fraud or bad faith.
211. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939).
212. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 52-53 (Colo. 1996).
213. See PagosaI, 170 P.3d 307, 317-318 (Colo. 2007).
214. See Holmes, 400 P.2d at 904 (dissenting, Justice Frantz remarked "[a] vigilant,
dutiful judiciary should recognize its sphere of operation and readily restrain itself from
any inchmeal intrusion on that which properly belongs to another branch of
government."); Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 288 (Colo. 1961) (holding that courts should not substitute its
judgments for that of the government's in water supply determinations); Sheriff, 96
P.2d at 840, 844 (holding that "[tQhe furnishing of an adequate supply of water .. .
requires managerial judgment . : . . [T]he restrictions involved here, would be an
arbitrary violation of vested property rights of the city.").
215. § 37-60-126(1)(g) (providing that "'Water conservation' means water use
efficiency, wise water use, water transmission and distribution system efficiency, and
supply substitution. The objective of water conservation is a long-term increase in the
productive use of water supply in order to satisfy water supply needs without
compromising desired water services.").
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troubling for a number of reasons.2 16
Apparently, conservation
measures are pertinent because beneficial use requires "use of that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably
efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made...,217 Thus, a municipality must
show its use is reasonably efficient, which a conservation plan can
demonstrate. Further, the State of Colorado requires governmental
entities providing more than 2,000 acre-feet to implement a water
conservation plan encouraging its customers to use water more
efficiently. 2 8 The plan must include a description of the water-saving
measures and programs, the role of the conservation plan in its water
supply planning, the steps used to develop and implement the water
conservation plan, the time period the entity will review and update its
conservation plan and an estimate of the amount of water that the
conservation plan has and will save.2 19
A conservation plan is a strategy to conserve water.220 If the water
user is a governmental entity, it must adopt that strategy pursuant to its
governmental process. 221 Normally, an elected council or Board passes
a conservation plan, acting in a legislative capacity that is subject to
public input and review.222 However, when the court must determine
the reasonableness of a conservation plan, the court then substitutes its
judgment for that of the governing body. This comes at the expense of
government agencies' legislative discretion, as different governmental
entities may desire different conservation objectives.
The minimum water saving measures and programs that the state
requires include: water efficient fixtures and appliances low water use
landscapes, water efficient industrial and commercial water using
processes, water reuse systems, distribution system leak repairs,
education, rate structures designed to discourage water use, billing
systems, regulatory measures, and incentives including rebates. 223 Most
conservation plans do not include drought mitigation or response
plans. 224 Further, a municipality's conservation plan must be balanced
with its goal to develop a reliable water supply that will meet peak
demands under efficient practices without mandatory water use

216. See PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 317.
217. § 37-92-103(4).
218. Id. § 37-60-126(1)(b), (2)(a).
219. Id. § 37-60-126(4) (a)-(e).
220. Colorado Water
Conservation Board,
Drought Miu'gation Planning,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/Conservation/DroughtPlanning/DroughtMitigationPlanning/
DroughtMitigationPlanning.htm [hereinafter Colorado Water Conservation Board,
Drought] (stating that "[a]. Water Conservation Plan can be defined as a strategy or
combination of strategies for reducing the volume of water withdrawn from a water
supply source, for reducing the loss or waste of water, for maintaining or improving the
efficiency in the use of water, and for increasing the reuse of water") (last visitedJan. 31,
2010).
221. § 37-60-126(5).
222. See id.
223. § 37-60-126(4) (a).
224. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Drought,supra note 220.
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restrictions because those restrictions can cause economic injury.2 2 5
Compounding matters, the court's conservation factors leave the door
open to a host of issues:
* What constitutes a reasonable conservation plan?
* What if another governmental entity has a stricter
conservation plan than the appropriator-does that mean
the court can pass judgment and deny an application
because the conservation plan could be different?
* What sanction should be imposed if the conservation plan is
changed, or is not strictly implemented or enforced?
The next pertinent factor, requiring a governmental applicant to
show its reasonably expected land use mixes during that period, also
presents a host of questions and problems. 2

26

To satisfy this factor, the

227
applicant must present evidence of undeveloped land and its zoning.
Land zoned for residential use may have different per capita demand
228
than land zoned for commercial, governmental, or industrial uses.
This is a reasonable method to forecast demands but it is not the only
method to forecast demands, particularly if the service area is "built
out."229 An examination of reasonable land use mixes in an already
developed metropolitan area does not allow for an accurate prediction
of future demands within the area. Property uses and zoning can easily
change over a fifty-year period. Areas that were once used for industrial
purposes can give way to new residential uses and vice versa. Further, a
land use based water demand projection does not take into account the
potential for an increase in density over the years. Econometric
demand models and simple trend spreadsheets, which are based on
anticipated regional economic and demographic growth rather than
projected land use mixes, are other planning methods, which can more
accurately predict future demand for a developed metropolitan area.23

225. For example, in 2002, Denver Water Board imposed drought restrictions that
precluded the watering of new sod and restricted watering of golf courses to only tees
and greens. The landscaping industry suffered economic harm and in some cases golf
See Tom Kensler, Dirt-Poor Condition Water
courses had to replace fairways.
Restrictions Deny Golf Course OperatorsChance to Save Fairways,THE DENVER POST,
May 1, 2003, at D-10 (asserting the Denver Water Board's restriction on watering "all
areas except tee boxes and greens ....

And . . . total water usage ...

limited to 50

percent of the amount the course used in 2001" resulted in the loss of several golf
fairways in the Denver area); Jerd Smith, Tough Choices, ROcKv MOUNTAIN NEws, Apr.
17, 2003, at 12A (reporting on the Denver Water Board's decisions on "plea after plea
from landscapers, sod growers, and golfers.").
226. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 317-19 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
227. See generallyid. at 317-319.
228. See WILLIAM Y. DAvIS, WATER DEMAND FORECAST METHODOLOGY FOR CALIFORNIA
WATER PLANNING AREAS 1-2 (2003) (showing that commercial activity, industrial activity,

and urban water efficiency are all factors affecting water demand).
229. Id. "Built out" is a future event when all undeveloped land is fully developed.
However, even fully developed lands can accommodate future growth and additional
water supplies with increased density.
230. E-mail from Doug L.Jeavons, Managing Director BBC Research & Consulting, to
Casey S. Funk, Denver Water (Jan. 4, 2010, 10:30:00 MST) (on file with author).
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When a court assesses the reasonableness of the expected land use
mixes, the court again substitutes its judgment for that of the elected
officials, who are responsible for the quality of life decisions that a
governmental entities should make.
In addition, too many confounding factors affect or influence the
attainability of reasonable per capita usage projections for indoor and
outdoor use based on the land use mixes for a planning period, with
weather being the most significant of these factors. If it rains, then per
2
3
capita use goes down." ' If it is hot and dry, per capita use goes up. 32
So should a governmental agency assume hot and dry per capita usage
without restrictions to be prudent and conservative?
Most
governmental entities design their systems to meet a peak instantaneous
demand, which usually occurs when the climate is hot and dry.23 But
should the court impose hypothetical restrictions to ascertain
reasonably efficient practices? Further, people who live outside the
service area but have jobs inside the service area may not be factored in
a per capita calculation.
Remember, the court in Sheriff and
Metropolitan Suburban deferred to the governmenttls need for
flexibility and its exercise of managerial judgment. 234 By assessing the
reasonableness of the per capita use in the governmental service area,
the court once again becomes the decision maker.
With regard to the consumptive use factor, a
governmental
applicant must now present evidence of "the amount of consumptive
use reasonably necessary for use through the conditional appropriation
to serve the increased population. 2, 35 For this pertinent factor, the
Colorado Supreme Court cited an article, which concluded a
municipality need only to "replace" the amount consumed in an
augmentation plan.23 6 Thus, the authors of the article concluded that
the "size of the required water supply is usually determined by the
amount of water that will be physically consumed, not actually diverted
from a water source." 237 But this factor can be misleading. For
example, of one acre-foot of water used in a home, less than 10% of the
water may be permanently lost to the stream due to evaporation,
human consumption, other consumption associated with household
uses, or losses occurring as part of the wastewater treatment process. 23 9
The remaining 90% of the water not consumed returns to its source.239
231. See John Bougadis, Kaz Adamowski & Roman Diduch, Short-Term Municipal
Water DemandForecasting,19 HYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES 137, 143-47 (2005).
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939); Metro.
Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 288
(1961).
235. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 318 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
236. Id. at 318 n.10; Daniel S. Young & Duane D. Helton, Developing a Water Supply
in Colorado:The Role ofan Engineer,3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 373, 377 (2000).
237. Idat 377.
238. See id. at 377-378.
239. Id.
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In determining the amount of water needed to serve its customers,
municipalities do not base their determination of need solely on the
10% of water a single home will consumptively use, but also on the
entire acre-foot of water that a home will "use" while the 10% is being
consumed.24 ° In other words, a municipality needs to be able to provide
the ten gallons that a homeowner will use in taking the shower, not just
the single gallon the towel will "consume". The "one size fits all"
application of a consumptive use factor is not pertinent for many water
users, and it has limited applicability in determining total municipal
demands.
Further, while many municipalities operate significant portions of
their systems under an augmentation plan, many others do not. 4 '
Some municipalities developed their water systems before the 1969 Act
and base their requirements the old fashioned way - by satisfying
diversion demands in accordance with the priority system. 4 2 For
example, the Denver Water Board diverts under its direct flow rights
when it is in priority and exchanges water or releases water from storage
when it is out of priority to meet its fluctuating demands.243 The Denver
Water Board does not to any significant degree, operate its municipal
system under an augmentation plan; thus, its consumptive use does not
drive major portions of its decision making. 2 " Instead, the Denver
Water Board predicts its future diversion demands based upon
historical use data 245 and various factors of water use including
population, employment, household size, precipitation, and lawn
size.246
In Pagosa,the Colorado Supreme Court did not foreclose the water
court from considering other factors in determining the reasonableness
of the particular governmental agency's anticipated needs. 47 Other
factors could include flood control, water administration requirements,
distribution losses, safety factors, operational emergencies, permit
requirements, climate variability, recreational uses, piscatorial uses, and
aesthetic uses. These additional needs may not involve a determination
240. See id. at 378.
241. See, e.g., Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Simpson, 167 P.3d 729, 731-34
(Colo. 2007) (involving municipality which operates its system through an

augmentation plan).
242. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939) (stating that a
senior water right holder may not confer his senior water rights to a junior user out of
priority without justifying his actions).
243. E-mail from Robert G. Steger Manager of Raw Water Supply, to Casey S. Funk,
Denver Water (Mar. 4, 2010, 5:37:00 MST) (on file with author).

244. Id.
245. DENVER WATER, AN INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE PLAN 40 (2002),
http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/DDA6502B-BCDF-1B42D6B27D086AD6731A/MasterDocIRPOnlinel.pdf.; see also Young & Helton, supra note
236 at 381 ("Many larger municipalities have historical water use data that are used to
develop more accurate water use estimates, which can also be used to project future
municipal water needs.").
246. Id. at 14-42.
247. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa ), 170 P.3d
307, 318 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
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of consumptive use, land use mixes, or population projections.
In PagosaII, the court held that carryover storage equal to the water
system's annual demand may be necessary to meet the District's
reasonably anticipated 2055 water needs. 248 However, possession of a
safety reserve is also prudent from a governing body's perspective in
case droughts are worse than what historical gage data has recorded.249
But a governing body may not place safety factor or strategic reserve
water to an actual beneficial use unless there is an emergency. 's this
speculation, or prudent municipal planning? Currently, the Denver
Water Board has a policy to reserve 30,000 acre-feet of yield in its system
for catastrophic events: larger than unexpected build-out demands,
lower than expected yield from its water rights and facilities, and longer
than anticipated droughts. 2 50 For example, the gauged data during a
critical dry period in the 1950s influences Denver Water Board's
yield.251 If a drought occurs that is more severe than the critical period,
then Denver Water Board's yield will be less. Even with mandatory
restrictions, a safety factor or strategic reserve is prudent to protect from
droughts more severe than the historical gauged data reflects.
Where the people and the General Assembly have authorized local
governments to develop and operate water works systems and facilities,
the courts should defer to the exercise of that legislative decision
making unless it is fraudulent, abuses discretion, or is inherently
unsound.25 2 The doctrine of maximum utilization under the 1969 Act
did not take away any of these powers provided to governmental

248. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I1), 219 P.3d
774, 785 (Colo. 2009).
249. Tree ring studies have confirmed occurrences of drought conditions more
severe than the past 100 years of gauged data. See Woodhouse, supra note 141 at 354;
Connie A. Woodhouse & Jeffrey J. Lukas, Multi-Century Tree-Ring Reconstructions of
Colorado Streamflow for Water Resource Planning,78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 293, 293-94
(2006); David M. Meko et al., Medieval Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin,
GEoPHYsIcAL

RESEARCH

LETrERS

(2007),

https://portal.azoah.com/oedf/documents/08A-AWSOO1DWR/Omnia/20070524%2OMeko%20et%20a1%2OMedieval%2ODrought%20CO%20R
iver.pdf.

250.
DENVER

Currently, eight percent of Denver Water Board's current estimated firm yield.
WATER,

AN
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WATER

RESOURCE

PLAN

9,

7,

69

(2002),

http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/DDA6502B-BCDF-1B42D6B27D086AD6731A/MasterDoclRPOnlinel.pdf.
251. Yield has various meanings. Firm/dry/reliable yield is the amount of water that
the water rights and facilities of a municipality can produce in a dry hydrologic period.
Average yield is the amount of water that water rights and facilities in a normal
hydrologic period can produce. All things being equal, average hydrologic conditions
will yield more water than dry hydrologic conditions but average yield will be less
reliable than firm yield. See generally W. B. LANGBEIN & KATHLEEN T.ISERI, GENERAL
INTRODUCTION

&

HYDROLOGIC

DEFINITIONS

(1995)

available

at

http://water.usgs.gov/wsc/glossary.html (defining "Water Yield"); B. Srdjevic, Y. D. P.
Medeiros & A. S. Faria, An Objective Multi-CriteriaEvaluation of Water Management
Scenarios, 18 WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 35, 42 (2004) (discussing how to calculate

"firm yield.").
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-708 (2009).
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agencies53 Rather, the doctrine simply encouraged distribution of
plans,.
waters for different beneficial purposes such as augmentation
54
instream flows, and recreational instream channel diversions.1
In making that determination of deference, the court should
consider whether the governmental agencies determined their water
supply needs in an open public process by which the public and
interested stakeholders could have scrutinized the reasons for the water
supply period and the basis for the governmental agencies' need for
additional water. The courts should consider:
(1) Does the municipality have a process to determine its water

supply needs?
(2) Has it followed its process?
(3) Who was involved in the process?
(4) What information was considered?
(5) What assumptions were made? and
(6) Is there a record of that decision making.
Unless there is evidence of fraud or abuse of discretion, the judiciary
should then defer to the decisions the governmental body's decisions in
its legislative or quasi-legislative capacity.
CONCLUSION
In Pagosa I and Biou, the Colorado Supreme Court applied the
chicken or the egg principle when it observed:
The conditional appropriation must not be based on a conjectural
population projection that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of
Most Front Range municipalities in Colorado could
growth.
conjecture growth in the next few decades at exponential rates. To
some extent, that growth is directly related to the ability of the
municipality to supply water. Hence, the projection becomes a selffulfilling prophecy if the municipality secures a right to the water
necessary to sustain the growth. We do not view such conjecture as
sufficient substantiation to support a conditional decree for water.
Municipalities must do more than represent
255 to the water court that if
they had water, they would be able to grow.
But will communities continue to thrive if their water supplies are
insufficient to sustain the community, and will communities' water
supply needs cease at end of the planning horizon? A simple test exists
at Mesa Verde National Park. Many believe the Park is the abandoned
home of an indigenous people who left their community during a

253. See generally § 37-92-102(l)(a) (not altering governmental powers of
appropriation set forth in Colorado's constitution).
254. Ironically, the General Assembly only authorized governmental agencies to make

such appropriations. §§ 37-92-102(3), (5).

255. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 315 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1,
39 n.25 (Colo. 1996).
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period of severe and prolonged drought and cooler temperatures.25 6 So
we offer the Pagosa question: are municipalities merely conjecturing
growth, or are they developing an adequate water supply capable of
sustaining their populations and economies into the future so that they,
too, do not become a piece of history like Mesa Verde?

256. MESA VERDE- THE FIRST 100 YEARS, 37 (Rose Houck & Faith Marcovecchio eds.,
Mesa Verde Museum Ass'n) (2006); Woodhouse, supra note 141 at 351.

